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Abstract—We study secure transmission considering the practical sce-
nario where only outdated knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s channel
and statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel is available at
the transmitter. Conditioned on the limited channel knowledge, we adopt
an on-off secure transmission scheme and propose a versatile strategy to
determine the codeword transmission rate. We first analyze the outage
performance of the system and then provide the design of optimal wiretap
code parameters maximizing the secrecy throughput. Compared with
the existing solution in the literature, the proposed secure transmission
design enlarges the achievable reliability-security region and increases
the maximum secrecy throughput.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, outdated CSI, reliability-security
region, secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of information transmission is becoming an increas-
ingly important concern in many wireless applications, such as
online banking and transmission of private medical data [1]. As a
promising method to enhance security, physical layer security has
recently attracted considerable attention. An important assumption in
previous studies is the availability of perfect channel knowledge of the
receivers at the transmitter. However, it is practically impossible for
the transmitter to know the eavesdropper’s channel state information
(CSI) if the eavesdropper is a passive device. Even the assumption
of the transmitter perfectly knowing the legitimate receiver’s CSI is
very idealistic. Therefore, recent studies have focused on the realistic
scenarios with imperfect CSI at the transmitter. Specifically, an on-off
scheme was designed in [2] to improve the secrecy performance when
the estimated CSI at the receivers is not perfect. In [3], an artificial-
noise-aided beamforming scheme was optimized to guarantee a
satisfactory level of secrecy when the CSI feedback link is rate-
constrained. Meanwhile, some research efforts have been devoted
towards the outdated CSI caused by the feedback delay [4, 5]. We
note that [4, 5] merely concentrated on the performance analysis
without further looking into the optimal design of practical secure
transmission schemes.
In this work, we consider a single-antenna system, i.e., a single-
input single-output single-eavesdropper (SISOSE) scenario. Consid-
ering only outdated knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s channel
and statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel available at
the transmitter, we design a new secure transmission scheme based
on the celebrated Wyner’s wiretap code. The key challenges faced in
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this specific scenario are the existence of two different outage events.
The first outage event, referred to as connection outage event, results
from the imperfect channel knowledge of the desired communication
channel. The second outage event, referred to as secrecy outage
event, is caused by the fact that the eavesdropper remains quiet and
its instantaneous CSI is unavailable to the transmitter. In order to
guarantee the target levels of reliability and security, one should
keep the two outage events under control when designing any secure
transmission scheme. Then the resulting design problem becomes:
Given connection and secrecy outage constraints, how to determine
wiretap code parameters with the aforementioned practical CSI
assumption?
To overcome this problem, in this work we design a new and
versatile strategy to determine the optimal codeword transmission rate
achieving the maximum secrecy throughput. We highlight that this
strategy makes a significant advancement than our latest contribution
in [6]. In [6], the transmission scheme for perfect CSI of the
legitimate channel was directly applied for the imperfect CSI case,
such that the codeword transmission rate is chosen as the estimated
main channel capacity. Different from [6], in this work we choose
the codeword transmission rate as a function of the estimated main
channel capacity, the secrecy rate, and a flexible tradeoff coefficient.
Using this function, our design achieves a larger feasible reliability-
security region and thus a higher maximum secrecy throughput.
Centering on this versatile design, we first derive an easy-to-compute
expression for the secrecy throughput. Based on this expression, we
determine the optimal wiretap code parameters that maximize the
secrecy throughput. Importantly, we find that the optimal codeword
transmission rate is smaller than the estimated main channel capacity,
which explains the advantage of our design over that in [6]. The
performance analysis and design guidelines presented in this paper
offer pivotal insights into the effective management of the outdated
CSI for achieving the desired levels of reliability and security.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wiretap channel where the communication between
the legitimate transmitter, Alice, and the legitimate receiver, Bob,
is overheard by an eavesdropper, Eve. We assume that Alice, Bob,
and Eve are equipped with a single antenna each. The Alice-Bob
channel and the Alice-Eve channel are referred to as the main
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively. We also assume
that the main channel coefficient and the eavesdropper’s channel
coefficient are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-
mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
unit variance across the coherence blocks. We focus on the practical
passive eavesdropping scenario where the instantaneous CSI of the
eavesdropper’s channel is not known at Alice. This scenario can also
be seen as a robust scenario for secrecy which allows for Eve’s
malicious behaviors, e.g., deliberately feeding back false CSI [2].
In this work, we assume that the instantaneous CSI of the main
channel obtained at Alice is outdated. In practice, the process of
acquiring CSI at Alice may take a long time duration for pilot
training, channel estimation, and CSI feedback. It follows that the
main channel knowledge received at Alice may be outdated for the
subsequent data transmission. Under this assumption, we denote hb 
CN (0; 1) as the main channel coefficient obtained during the channel
estimation and feedback process. We also denote h^b  CN (0; 1) as
the main channel coefficient in data transmission process. As such, h^b
is the d time-delayed version of hb, as characterized by the Gauss-
Markov model [7–9]. Mathematically, h^b is expressed as
h^b = hb +
p
1  2wb; (1)
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where  is the correlation coefficient between h^b and hb, and wb 
CN (0; 1) is the channel-independent error in the main channel. As
per the Clark’s fading model,  is formulated as  = J0(2fdd),
where J0() is the zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind and
fd is the maximum Doppler frequency at the receiver.
Based on (1), the received signal at Bob during the data transmis-
sion process is given by
yb =
p
Pd
 
2
b h^bx+ nb; (2)
where P denotes the transmit power, db and  denote the distance and
the path loss exponent (PLE) between Alice and Bob, respectively,
x denotes the transmit signal, and nb  CN
 
0; 2b

denotes the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob. Accordingly, the
instantaneous received signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) at Bob during
the data transmission process is given by ^b = jh^bj2Pd b =2b . It is
worth mentioning that the knowledge obtained at Alice based on the
feedback from Bob is b = jhbj2Pd b =2b , but not ^b.
We now present the preliminary statistical results of ^b and b to
facilitate our performance analysis. We note that both ^b and b have
an exponential distribution. Hence, the probability density functions
(PDFs) of ^b and b are uniformly expressed as
fb(x) =
1
b
e
  x
b ; (3)
where b 2 fb; ^bg and b = Pd b =2b denotes the average
received SNR at Bob. We also note that ^b and b are correlated
random variables. As a result, the conditional PDF of ^b conditioned
on a given b is given by [10]
f^bjb (y jx ) =
1
(1  2)b
e
  y+2x
(1 2)b I0

2
p
xy
(1  2)b

: (4)
We next formulate the eavesdropper’s channel. The received signal
at Eve during the data transmission process is given by
ye =
p
Pd
  
2
e h^ex+ ne; (5)
where h^e  CN (0; 1) denotes the eavesdropper’s coefficient during
data transmission process, de and  denote the distance and the
PLE between Alice and Eve, respectively, and ne  CN
 
0; 2e

denotes the AWGN at Eve. The instantaneous received SNR at
Eve during the data transmission process is accordingly written as
^e = jh^ej2Pd e =2e . Note that ^e has an exponential distribution.
As such, its PDF is given by
f^e(x) =
1
e
e
  x
e ; (6)
where e = Pd
 
e =
2
e denotes the average received SNR at Eve.
Although we assume that the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper’s
channel is not known at Alice, we assume that the statistical CSI, e,
is known at Alice [5, 10, 11].
In the wiretap channel Alice determines the wiretap code param-
eters in order to achieve the secrecy rate of Rs. Specifically, Alice
constructs a parameter pair (Rb; Re) for the wiretap code [12], where
Rb denotes the transmission rate of the codeword, Re denotes the
rate redundancy which provides secrecy against eavesdropping, and
Rs = Rb   Re. We note that the only knowledge about the main
channel obtained at Alice is the main channel capacity1 given by
Cb = log2 (1 + b). As such, Alice needs to design the wiretap
code parameters based on Cb solely. Our proposed new design of the
wiretap code parameters and the corresponding secure transmission
schemes will be detailed in Section III.
1We clarify that Alice cannot obtain the main channel capacity and the
eavesdropper’s channel capacity during the data transmission process, given
by C^b = log2 (1 + ^b) and C^e = log2 (1 + ^e), respectively.
III. NEW DESIGN OF SECURE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we first formulate the principle of our new design of
the wiretap code parameters. Using this design, we then analyze the
secrecy performance of the on-off transmission scheme and evaluate
the feasibility of the reliability and security constraints. Finally, we
solve the optimization problems of the secrecy throughput subject to
outage constraints.
A. Design of Wiretap Code Parameters
In this work we propose a new versatile design to determine the
optimal wiretap code parameters, which achieves a flexible tradeoff
between reliability and security. The versatility of our design lies
in the introduction of a tradeoff coefficient u, where u 2 (0; 1].
Mathematically, our design is expressed as
Rb = log2

2Rs + u

2Cb   2Rs

; (7)
which indicates that Rb is determined by Rs, u, and Cb. Based on
(7) and the range of u, we find that the value of Rb is within the
feasible range of (Rs; Cb]. Compared with the design of Rb = Cb
in [6], this design enables versatility on the choice of Rb for distinct
transmission blocks.
We highlight that in our design, Rb is adaptively determined
according to the feedback from Bob, while Rs is optimally chosen
and kept constant over the whole transmission period. This indicates
that our design can be treated as a semi-adaptive-Rb but fixed-Rs
scheme. Compared with the fully-adaptive strategies in the literature,
e.g., those from [13–16], we clarify that our semi-adaptive strategy
serves as a practically valuable enabler to provide the closed-form
expressions for the connection outage probability and secrecy outage
probability. As such, it facilitates us to design wiretap code parame-
ters under dual outage constraints in real time, without resorting to
complicated optimization-oriented signal processing algorithms. Of
course, this advantage is achieved at the cost of not achieving the
optimal performance.
B. Secrecy Performance Analysis
The on-off transmission scheme, which allows Alice to transmit
only when the main channel quality meets some predetermined
requirements, has attracted considerable attention in recent physical
layer security studies due to its ease of implementation [2, 3, 17, 18].
In our work, we apply this scheme since b is the only channel
knowledge obtained by Alice. Under this scheme, Alice transmits
only when Cb  Rs. We next present detailed analysis of the
governing secrecy performance metrics for the on-off transmission
scheme.
1) Transmission Probability: The transmission probability is for-
mulated as
ptx (Rs) = Pr fCb  Rsg : (8)
Using the cumulative density distribution (CDF) of b, we obtain
ptx (Rs) as
ptx (Rs) = Pr
n
b  2Rs   1
o
= e
  2Rs 1
b : (9)
2) Connection Outage Probability: The connection outage occurs
when the instantaneous main channel quality during the data trans-
mission process cannot support Rb, i.e., C^b < Rb. Accordingly, the
connection outage probability is given by
pco (u;Rs) = Pr
n
C^b < Rb jtransmission
o
: (10)
We clarify that the connection outage probability defined in (10) is
the probability of the connection outage event conditioned on the
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transmission event. That is, transmission outage is excluded from the
characterization of the connection outage probability. Using (8) and
(10), we derive the connection outage probability as
pco (u;Rs) = Pr
n
C^b < Rb jCb  Rs
o
= 1  e
(u 2)(2Rs 1)
(1 2)b
1X
n=0
1X
k=0
 
1  2 2(n+k)
  (n+ k + 1) k!

kX
q=0
 
k
q
!
(1  u)k q 2Rs   1k quq
((1  2) b)k q(1 + u)n+k+q+1
  
 
n+ k + q + 1;
(1 + u)
 
2Rs   1
(1  2) b
!
; (11)
where   () and   (; ) are the Gamma function and the incomplete
Gamma function defined in [19]. We claim that the proof of (11) is
similar to the derivation for [6, Eq. (12)]. Hence, in this work we
omit detailed proof.
3) Secrecy Outage Probability: The secrecy outage occurs when
the rate redundancy Re is lower than the instantaneous eavesdropper’s
channel capacity during the data transmission process, i.e., Re < C^e.
Mathematically, the secrecy outage probability is given by
pso (u;Rs) = Pr
n
Re < C^e jtransmission
o
: (12)
Using (8) and (12), we derive the connection outage probability as
pso (u;Rs) = Pr
n
Re<C^e jCb  Rs
o
=
2Rse
2Rse+ub
: (13)
4) Reliable-and-Secure Connection Probability: To examine the
reliability and security in a unified manner, we define the reliable-
and-secure connection probability2 as
pr&s (u;Rs) = Pr
n
C^b  Rb; Re  C^e jtransmission
o
: (14)
Using (8) together with (14), we derive the reliable-and-secure
connection probability as
pr&s (u;Rs) = Pr
n
C^b  Rb; Re  C^e jCb  Rs
o
= e
2Rs 1
b (`1   `2) ; (15)
where `1 is given by
`1 =
1X
n=0
1X
k=0
2(n+k)
 
1  2
2n+2k+1  (k + 1)  (n+ k + 1)
  
 
n+ 2k + 1;
2
 
2Rs   1
(1  2) b
!
; (16)
and `2 is given by
`2 =e
  (1 u)2
Rse u(1 2)b
(1 2)2Rs(2Rs 1) 1be
1X
n=0
1X
k=0
2(n+k)
 
1  2
k!  (n+ k + 1)

kX
q=0
 
k
q
!
(1 u)k q 2Rs 1k quq
((1  2) b)k q
  
 
n+k+q+1;
 
u
 
1 2 b+(1+u) 2Rse
(2Rs 1) 1 (1 2) 2Rsbe
!


2Rse
u (1  2) b + (1 + u) 2Rse
n+k+q+1
: (17)
2We note that the connection outage and the secure outage are not mutu-
ally exclusive, indicating that the reliable-and-secure connection probability
between Alice and Bob is not equal to 1  pco   pso.
C. Feasibility of Outage Constraints
To guarantee the reliability and security levels of the wiretap
channel, we practically introduce a reliability constraint  and a
security constraint  in the design. Since the channel knowledge
known at Alice is limited, we next examine the feasible ranges of 
and  for a given u.
Using (11), we numerically find that pco (u;Rs) is an increasing
function of Rs for a given u. When Rs = 0, pco (u;Rs) achieves
its lower bound, pco;LB (u), which is derived as
pco;LB (u) = 1 
1X
n=0
1X
k=0
(n+ 2k)!2(n+k)
 
1  2uk
k! (n+ k)! (1 + u)n+2k+1
: (18)
Accordingly, the feasible range of  is obtained as
pco;LB (u) <   1: (19)
We next observe (13) and find that pso (u;Rs) is also an increasing
function of Rs for a given u. Thus, pso (u;Rs) achieves its lower
bound, pso;LB (u), when Rs = 0. This bound is derived as
pso;LB (u) =
e
e + ub
: (20)
The feasible range of  is accordingly obtained as
pso;LB (u) <   1: (21)
Based on (19) and (21), we clarify that the versatility of u enables
a tradeoff between reliability and security, leading to a larger feasible
reliability-security region.
D. Optimization of Wiretap Code Parameters
In this subsection, we first define the primary performance indicator
through this paper, i.e., the secrecy throughput. We then show that
our versatile design achieves a higher maximum secrecy throughput.
Finally, we present how to determine the optimal code parameters
for maximizing the secrecy throughput subject to outage constraints.
1) Secrecy Throughput: Through this paper we adopt the secrecy
throughput  as the preferred secrecy performance metric. Specifi-
cally, we define  as the product of the transmission probability ptx,
the reliable-and-secure connection probability pr&s, and the secrecy
rate Rs. Mathematically,  is formulated as
 (u;Rs) = ptx(Rs)pr&s (u;Rs)Rs; (22)
where ptx(Rs) and pr&s (u;Rs) are given by (8) and (14), respec-
tively. We clarify that the incorporation of pr&s allows us to measure
the average rate of the confidential information reliably transmitted
from Alice to Bob without being eavesdropped on by Eve.
2) The Benefit on the Maximum Secrecy Throughput: Considering
no outage constraints, we find that for a given Rs, the optimal u
maximizing (u;Rs) is the one that maximizes pr&s(u;Rs). For a
given Rs, we numerically find that pr&s(u;Rs) first increases and
then decreases as u increases from 0 to 1. This indicates that the
optimal u maximizing pr&s(u;Rs) is less than 1. Recall that [6]
is merely a special case of this work with u = 1. Therefore, our
versatile design leads to a higher maximum secrecy throughput. This
emphasizes the potential advantage of the versatile design in terms
of the secrecy throughput.
3) Optimization subject to Outage Constraints: We now determine
the values of u and Rs that maximize the secrecy throughput subject
to the connection and secrecy outage constraints. Given the fact
that perfect connection and perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed,
such maximization is of practical importance since it keeps the
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Fig. 1. Feasible region for u and Rs subject to connection and secrecy outage
constraints.
risk of decoding errors and being eavesdropped under control. The
optimization problem is expressed as
max
u;Rs
 (u;Rs) ;
subject to pco  ; pso  : (23)
The feasibility of  and  are indicated by (19) and (21), respectively.
Since  and  restrict the feasible region of the optimization problem
in (23), we firstly need to examine the feasible region for u and Rs.
Based on (11) and (13), we conclude that a lower Rs for a fixed
u leads to a lower pco and a lower pso, while a lower u for a fixed
Rs leads to a lower pco but a higher pso. Thus we can use Fig. 1 to
describe the sketch of the feasible region. Specifically, the shaded area
1 denotes the feasible region under the condition of pco  , while the
shaded area 2 denotes the feasible region under the condition of pso 
. As such, the overlap area 3 describes the feasible region of the
optimization problem in (23). Therefore, we solve this optimization
problem in two steps as follows:
Step 1: Determine the boundary lines, e.g., Arc-ab and Arc-cd.
Assisted by (11), we express a and b as
a = fRs jpco (0; Rs) = g ; b = fu jpco (u; 0) = g : (24)
Although the closed-form solutions for a and b are mathematically
intractable, we are able to obtain them using numerical search
methods. Then the boundary line Arc-ab can be numerically found.
Assisted by (13), we express c and d as
c = fRs jpso (1; Rs) =  g = log2

b
(1  ) e

; (25)
and
d = fu jpso (u; 0) =  g = (1  ) e
b
; (26)
respectively. Then the boundary line Arc-cd is determined.
Step 2: Search the optimum solutions, (u; Rs). After determining
the boundary lines, the feasible region of u and Rs is identified. The
final step is to find the optimal solutions maximizing the secrecy
throughput by using numerical search methods, e.g., the grid-search
method.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present numerical results in this section to illustrate the
benefits of our proposed versatile design. Throughout this section
the simulation settings are as follows, unless specified otherwise: The
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Fig. 2. Connection and secrecy outage probabilities versus u for  = 0:5,
b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
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Fig. 3. Reliable-and-secure connection probability versus u for b = 10 dB,
and e = 0 dB.
average received SNR at Bob and Eve are assumed to be b = 10
dB and e = 0 dB, respectively.3
Fig. 2 plots the connection and secrecy outage probabilities for
different values of Rs. In this figure, the theoretical curves for
pco (u;Rs) and pso (u;Rs) are generated from (11) and (13), re-
spectively. Importantly, we find that the Monte Carlo simulation
points, marked by “”, match precisely with the analytical curves.
This demonstrates the accuracy of our analysis. We first observe that
for a fixed Rs, increasing u leads to a higher connection outage
probability but a lower secrecy outage probability. This observation
can be explained by the fact that when Rs is fixed, a higher u brings
about a higher Rb, leading to a higher probability that ~Cb is lower
than Rb, but a lower probability that ~Ce is larger than Re. Second, we
observe that for a fixed u, both pco (u;Rs) and pso (u;Rs) increases
with the increase of Rs. This figure highlights that the versatility of u,
which lies in its ability of enabling a tradeoff between the reliability
and security.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 plot the reliable-and-secure connection probability
versus u and Rs, respectively. In these figures, the theoretical curves
for pr&s (u;Rs) are generated from (15). Numerical simulations
3To evidently show the secrecy performance, numerical results for the case,
where b is comparable or lower than e, are not presented. We assume that
Alice can use an external jammer to guarantee the advantage of the main
channel’s quality over the eavesdropper’s channel’s quality. However, this is
beyond the scope of this work.
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Fig. 4. Reliable-and-secure connection probability versus Rs for 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Fig. 5. Secrecy throughput versus u without dual outage constraints for  =
0:5, b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
are presented to corroborate our analytical results. From Fig. 3,
we observe that for a fixed Rs, pr&s (u;Rs) first increases and
then decreases with u. From Fig. 4, we observe that for a fixed
u, pr&s (u;Rs) decreases when Rs increases. Moreover, both Fig.
3 and Fig. 4 illustrate that pr&s (u;Rs) decreases as  decreases.
This is due to the fact that the uncertainty in the main channel
increases as  decreases, which results in poorer reliability and
security levels. Therefore, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 highlight the enhancement
in the reliability and security levels brought by the reduction in Rs
and the optimization on u.
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy throughput versus u with  = 0:5 for
different values of Rs. In this figure, the reliability and security
constraints are not considered. We first observe that for a fixed Rs,
 (u;Rs) first increases and then decreases as u increases from 0 to 1,
which confirms that an optimal u indeed exists such that the secrecy
throughput is maximized for a fixed Rs. Second, we observe that u
shifts to the right when Rs increases. For example, we find that when
Rs increases from 1 to 1:5, u grows from 0:39 to 0:44. Third, we
observe that it is not always beneficial to increase Rs. For example,
when  = 0:5 we find that Rs = 1:5 achieves a higher secrecy
throughput than Rs = 2:0 and Rs = 2:5. This observation indicates
that there exists an optimal Rs maximizing the secrecy throughput.
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy throughput versus Rs with optimal u
for different values of . In this figure, the reliability and security
constraints are not considered. We clarify that the value of u for
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Rs
η
(u
∗
,
R
s
)
ρ = 0.8
ρ = 0.7
ρ = 0.6
ρ = 0.5
R∗s = 1.55
R∗s = 1.6
R∗s = 1.7
R∗s = 1.5
Fig. 6. Secrecy throughput versus Rs without dual outage constraints for
b = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
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Fig. 7. Secrecy throughput subject to dual outage constraints for b = 10
dB and e = 0 dB.
each curve is optimized in this figure. We first observe that  (u; Rs)
first increases and then decreases when Rs increases, confirming the
uniqueness of Rs maximizing  (u; Rs) in Section III-D. Second,
we observe that Rs shifts to the right when  increases. For example,
we find that when  increases from 0:5 to 0:6, Rs grows from 1:5 to
1:55. Third, we observe that  (u; Rs) increases when  becomes
higher. This observation implies that a higher secrecy throughput is
supported when more knowledge about the main channel is available
at Alice.
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy throughput versus the reliability and
security constraints for  = 0:5 and  = 0:8. In this figure, the
curved surface for  (u; Rs) subject to dual outage constraints
is generated from (23). We first observe that a positive secrecy
throughput only exists within the feasible region of the security and
reliability constraints. We also observe that for a fixed  (or ), the
secrecy throughput initially increases with  (or ) and then becomes
saturated after  (or ) exceeds a certain threshold. For example, when
 = 0:8, the thresholds for dual outage constraints are th = 0:34 and
th = 0:42. We further observe that the maximum secrecy throughput
is always achieved when the dual outage constraints exceed these
thresholds. This is due to the fact that when the constraints are higher
than th and th, the optimal u and Rs obtained without outage
constraints can always be adopted to perform secure transmission.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the SISOSE wiretap channel where
only outdated knowledge of the main channel and statistical knowl-
edge of the eavesdropper’s channel are available at the transmitter.
We designed a versatile strategy to choose the optimal codeword
transmission rate for the on-off transmission scheme. Based on the
performance analysis, we showed that how to determine the optimal
wiretap code parameters maximizing the secrecy throughput. Our
results revealed that by applying our versatile strategy, a larger
feasible the reliability-security region and a higher maximum secrecy
throughput are achieved.
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